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test so that the contributory negligence of one person cannot
be used to bar recovery by one who is himself free from fault.
A. L. Wright II

TORTS

-

LIABILITY OF CREDITOR FOR CONTACTING EMPLOYER
OF DEBTOR AS COLLECTION METHOD'

Plaintiff, a trusted bank employee, and associates contracted
with defendant printer to secure publication of a shoppers'
guide. Subsequently, the plaintiff's venture was incorporated
but the corporation soon failed. Defendant, a large depositor
of the employer-bank, wrote the bank's president that he had
been unable to collect a printing debt from plaintiff and would
appreciate assistance in securing payment. 2 Plaintiff explained
to his employer that the debt had been incurred during the existence of the corporation and that he was merely a stockholder
and not personally liable.8 When the employer communicated
this explanation to the defendant, he responded that plaintiff
had initiated the venture and had not disassociated himself
from personal responsibility. 4 The employer then notified
plaintiff that "he had heard enough of the matter and . . .
wanted it to be settled." 5 Thereupon, plaintiff's attorney wrote
defendant, warning him to cease his communication with plaintiff's employer. Defendant took this letter to the bank and
following a meeting of defendant with plaintiff and his employer, plaintiff was dismissed. Plaintiff brought suit for damages, and the trial court dismissed the action. On appeal, the
1. This Note is concerned with attempts to collect just or disputed debts.

There seems little question that an action would lie where a debt is falsely im-w
puted to a person. See note
. 2. The letter concluded,
and do so only because of
We will greatly appreciate

6 infra.
"We dislike having to bring this to your attention
the unsatisfactory response we get from Mr. Pack.
any assistance you may care to give us in securing

payment so that we will not have to proceed further against Mr. Pack." 155
So. 2d at 911.
3. See LA. R.S. 12:19B (1950): "A shareholder of a corporation . . . shall
not be personally liable for any debt or liability of the corporation."
* 4. There was evidence that defendant had been informed prior to incorporation by an associate of plaintiff that the associate would be personally liable for
the debt. 155 So. 2d at 910. After incorporation this associate informed defendant that he no longer would be personally liable. Defendant at least knew plain-

tiff's relationship to the venture had changed, but it does not-appear whether he
had been specifically informed plaintiff had disassociated himself from personal
responsibility for the enterprise. Id. at 911.
5. Id.

at 911.'
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Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. Held, contacting an
employer on several occasions in reference to an employee's disputed debts, after notification that the debtor considers he has
a valid defense, constitutes an unreasonable violation of the
right to privacy or a tortious attempt to coerce the payment of
a debt, and is actionable by the employee. Pack v. Wise, 155
So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; cert. denied, 157 So. 2d 231
(La. 1963).
Notification to a debtor's employer of the existence of a debt
has been a favorite method of facilitating collection. Though
such action has given rise to much litigation, there is disagreement as to the applicable theory, and what conduct on the part
of the creditor will so overbalance the social interest in the
integrity of the credit system to give rise to a cause of action.
In recent decisions two related theories of liability have been
most widely used: invasion of privacy and intentional infliction
6
of mental suffering.
The right to privacy is frequently defined as the "right to
6. A third theory frequently used is defamation, with all of the cases found
having been brought under the branch of libel. It has been held that it is defamatory of a person to communicate that he refuses to pay his just debts. Neigel v.
Seaboard Fin. Co., 68 N.J. Super. 542, 173 A.2d 300 (1961) ; Neaton v. Lewis
Apparel Stores, Inc., 267 App. Div. 728, 48 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1944) ; Keating v.
Conviser, 219 App. Div. 836, 220 N.Y.S. 874 (1927), aff'd mem., 246 N.Y. 632,
159 N.E. 680 (1927) ; Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N.W. 123 (1890).
Where the communication can fairly be taken to injure the person in his business, trade, or occupation courts have readily labeled this libelous per se, and
thus relieved the plaintiff of the necessity of proving special damages. Walker v.
Sheehan, 80 Ga. App. 606, 56 S.E.2d 628 (1949). But courts have split on the
question whether a communication to an employer concerning the alleged debt of
an employee is sufficient to allow the employee the advantage of the last-stated
rule. Compare Schieve v. Cincinnati Suburban Bell Tel. Co., 71 Ohio L. Abs.
850, 126 N.E.2d 817 (1955), with Ragland v. Household Fin. Corp., 254 Iowa
976, 119 N.W.2d 788 (1963). The rationale for holding that an employee cannot
sue in libel for such a notification to his employer without showing special damages Is that an allegation that an employee owes an unpaid bill does not normally reflect on his ability to perform his job or his qualifications for a job,
Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga. App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286 (1959) ; Ragland v. Household Fin. Corp., supra. Cf. Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co.,
222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936). Other courts have held that such notice to
the employer is actionable even when the alleged debtor is not so engaged that
financial credit is a necessary factor in his trade or business, on the theory that
this impairs the employee's standing in the mind of his employer and otherwise
brings him into disrepute. Neigel v. Seaboard Fin. Co., supra; Neaton v. Lewis
Apparel Stores, Inc., supra; Schieve v. Cincinnati Suburban Tel. Co., aupra. Cf.
Stickle v. Trimmer, 50 N.J. Super. 518, 143 A.2d 1 (1958) (New Jersey considers all libel actionable without proof of special damages).
In most jurisdictions truth is a defense to a suit for libel. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 96 (2d ed. 1955). Further, it normally does not matter that the communication
was only for purposes of spite. Ibid. So this theory is limited in use to the situation where the debt is in fact not owed. This explains the increasing use in this
area of the theories of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of mental
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be let alone, ' 7 but this definition is misleading since the right
is not absolute and protects only against invasions which are
"unreasonable" and "serious." '8 Courts have recognized that
the creditor has the right to take reasonable action in pursuing
his debtor and effecting payment, although an invasion of the
debtor's privacy may result incidentally.9 Thus it has been
held that the creditor will not incur liability merely by informing the debtor's employer of the debt, 10 even if in the process
the notification comes to the attention of other employees."' At
the other extreme, general publication of the debt will clearly
give rise to liability. 1 2 The cases in which the creditor has not
incurred liability are justified on several grounds: the employer
may be troubled with garnishment proceedings if the employee
does not pay his debts, while the public has no such interest ;13
the right to keep informed on the financial status of present
employees is a corollary of the right to hire only those who pay
their bills ;14 by contracting a debt the employee impliedly consents to contacts with his employer as a means of collection ;15
suffering, neither of which depends upon falsity of the matter brought to the
attention of another.
7. See COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
8. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939).

9. See notes 10-16 infra.
10. Tollefson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 142 Colo. 442, 351 P.2d 274 (1960)
Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957)
Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga. App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286 (1959) ; Patton v. Jacobs,
118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948); Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112
N.W.2d 862 (1962) ; Lucas v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. App.
1953) ; Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1951) ; Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956) ; Lewis v. Physicians
& Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
11. Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948). Of. Davis v.
General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950).
12. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. App. 1927) ; cf. Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
13. Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948) ; Lucas v.
Moskins Stores, Inc., 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. App. 1953) ; Voneye v. Turner, 240
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1951); Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau,
Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
14. Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948) ; Voneye v.
Turner, 240 S.W.2d 558 (Ky. App. 1951).
15. Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881
(1957) ; Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1951). In Zerbst the court
said: "[S]ending the letter in this case to the plaintiff's employer did not violate
her right of privacy. The right of privacy is not absolute but is qualified by the
rights of others. 'No individual can live in an ivory tower and at the same time
participate in society and expect non-interference from other members of the public ., . . . [O]ne who . . . is employed by a large corporation, who is an active

participant in the business world, who has an automobile and drives it upon the
highways, has it serviced and repaired, and obtains credit for goods and services
used in repairing her car, may expect reasonable conduct on the part of those
with whom she does business and from whom she gets credit . . . . She may

expect her employer to want her to pay her bill, and may further expect her
creditor to use reasonable means to persuade her to do so, and on failure to per-
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and invasion of privacy is based on publicity, which in turn
requires communication to large numbers of persons.1
Yet,
where aggravating circumstances are added to the notification
of the employer, such as a systematic campaign of harassment
while the employee is at work, 17 or additional intrusions into
the employee's private life away from work,' courts have not
been reluctant to find an actionable invasion of privacy.'9
Though more difficult to classify, the second body of cases
is based on the common element of wrongful coercion, and perhaps is best considered under the tort of intentional infliction
of mental suffering. In the absence of accompanying physical
injury, common law courts long denied recovery for such injury.20 On the other hand, a Louisiana creditor was early held
liable for use of a collection method which depended on intentional infliction of mental distress, 2' and common law courts
suade to force her to do so through the courts. When she accepts the credit, she
impliedly consents for her creditor to take all reasonable and necessary action to
collect the bill.

Writing to her employer .,.

. was . . . a reasonabe exercise of,

his rights and constituted no unwarranted or unreasonable interference with her
right of privacy." 213 Ga. at 684, 100 S.E.2d at 883.
16. Tollefson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 142 Colo. 442, 351 P.2d 274 (1960)
Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957)
Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948) ; Yoder v. Smith, 253
Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962) ; Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529,
148 S.W.2d 708 (1941) ; Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 558 (Ky. App. 1951) ;
Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. App. 1927) ; Hawley v. Professional Credit
Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956) ; Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists
Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947); of. McKinzie v.
Huckaby, 112 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Okla. 1953) ; Davis v. Gen. Fin. & Thrift
Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950). But see Norris v. Moskin Stores,
Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961).
17. Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
18. Housh v. Peth, 99 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955), ajf'd, 165 Ohio
St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) ; cf. Norris v. Moskin Stores, 272 Ala. 174, 132
So.2d 321 (1961).
19. Early language indicated there could be liability for invasion of privacy
only when the invasion was by written statement, but developing communications
media have destroyed the rationale behind this rule - that oral statements did
not lead to serious invasion. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HA.Rv. L. REv. 193, 217 (1890). Today the method used to call the debt to the
attention of the employer will not be determinative of liability. Norris v. Moskin'
Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) ; Biderman's of Springfield,
Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) ; Housh v. Peth, 99 Ohio App. 485,
135 N.E.2d 440 (1955) ; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216
P.2d 571 (1950) ; contra, Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27
Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
20. See PROssER, TORTS § 11 (2d ed. 1955).

21. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919). In Tuyes the court
held that article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code recognized recovery for mental
suffering without accompanying physical injury. The court said: "The threat to.
place the lists in merchants' display windows, and to advertise for sale, etc.,'
could have but one purpose, and that is to, through fear, induce the payment of,
money which could not otherwise be collected. . . . Let it be understood that we.
do not hold that creditors have not the right to use all legitimate means to collect'
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later reached similar results. 22 As under the theory of invasion
of privacy, creditors have been recognized to have the right
to urge payment of a just debt by threatening legal action,
23
even if mental suffering incidentally results to the debtor.
The courts, however, have not permitted a creditor to abuse
his position, 24 and redress will be granted when he resorts to
"extreme and outrageous" conduct to collect the debt. 2 Thus,
if the creditor contacts the employer on many occasions, 2 adopts
pseudo legal forms in his correspondence to mislead the employer and strengthen the force of his appeal, 27 or berates the
employee in front of his employer, 28 he will be liable.
their just accounts. The law points out those methods." 144 La. at 734, 81 So.
at 269.
22. E.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, 105 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Herman Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265
(1934) ; Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950);
Barnett v. Collection Ser. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) ; Lyons v.'
Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963) ; LaSalle Extension Univ. v.
Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) ; Duty v. Gen. Fin. Co., 154 Tex.
16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
23. E.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, 105 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir. 1939): "We do not suggest that creditors must use care to avoid
shocking their debtors or may not, for purposes of collection, intentionally inflict
some worry and concern." People's Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413,
414, 82 P.2d 994, 995 (1938) : "Fright, caused or induced by mere declarations
that defendant would resort to its legal remedy, is insufficient to provide a basis
for recovery. To hold otherwise would, in the final analysis, be to say that a
creditor cannot declare his intention to resort to a legal remedy in order to enforce an obligation without opening the way to become liable in damages because
of injury and physical suffering alleged to have been caused thereby. In other
words, such a rule could only serve to throw down the bars to an endless field of
litigation, ultimately serving as a means of evasion to be used by debtors against
their creditors, as a deterrent to collection of honest obligations." See also Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) ; LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
24. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1939) ;Herman Saks & Sons v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265 (1934) ;
Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950) ; Barnett v.
Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) ; Tuyes v. Chambers,
144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919) ; Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Orl."
Cir. 1944); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963) ; Duty V.
General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) ; cf. LaSalle Extension
Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
25. People's Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413, 82 P.2d 994 (1938).,
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1957 revision). Cf. Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co.,
150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963) (dictum).
26. LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934)
Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) ; cf. Barnett v.
Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932). But see Quina v.Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944) (creditor liable for contacting
employer on one occasion; used misleading forms, and overstated debt).
27. Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944) (creditor sent
employer notice styled "Final Notice Before Suit" and "In the Matter of the
claim of Robert's Jewelry Store vs. Mr. A. J. Quina"; debt of employee was overstated; that employer was not misled does not mitigate wrong).
28. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954),; cf. Bowden.
v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950) ; Tuyes v. Chambers,
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It must be recognized that the dichotomy between invasion

of privacy and intentional infliction of mental suffering is artificial, and exists mainly since both torts are relatively new
and their ambits of protection are yet undefined.2 9 Much con-

duct actionable under one theory is also actionable under the
other, and it has been suggested that the same distinction is
controlling in each: that "between conduct which outrages the
common decencies and goes beyond what the public mores will
tolerate, and that which the plaintiff must be expected under
' 30
the circumstances to endure.
In the instant case the extent of the court's reliance on the

above theories is unclear; the court indicated that the defendant's conduct was actionable either as an invasion of plaintiff's privacy or as a tortious attempt to coerce payment of a
disputed debt.3 ' Though the defendant was not unreasonable
in believing that plaintiff owed the debt and was without malice
in asserting his claim, neither factor was sufficient to over-

come the paramount interest of plaintiff in an undisturbed
relationship with his employer. Apparently the holding of this
case should be restricted to its facts, as the court emphasized
the entire course of the defendant's conduct in finding him

liable.3 2 Thus, it might be argued that the conduct was tortious

144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919).
29. It appears the reason why cases are frequently prosecuted under only one
of the available theories is that the other theories may not be recognized in that
jurisdiction. See Housh v. Peth, 99 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955), affirmed 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956), where invasion of privacy was
used to allow recovery for conduct which perhaps would be better classified as
"extreme and outrageous conduct." See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAIJF. L. REv. 383,
386 (1960).
As more states recognize both invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction
of mental suffering, any distinctions between them are likely to become less important.
30. PROSsFa, TORTS § 97, at 644 (2d ed. 1955).
31. "Wise's conduct constituted an unreasonable violation of the plaintiff's
right to privacy or a tortious attempt to coerce Pack into paying the disputed
debt - in short, the commission by Wise of a tort against Pack." 155 So. 2d
at 914.
32. "[A]ssuming that the simple action of contacting a debtor's employer is
not actionable in Louisiana as coercive in itself (but see Quina v. Robert's), it
might well be argued that the defendant Wise's actions in writing the initial
letter and in following it up with an explanatory telephone call in response to
the bank's reply to his initial letter did not by themselves constitute conduct on
his part unreasonably violating the plaintiff's right to privacy. However, we think
that, in cumulation with his past conduct, Wise plainly committed an actionable
tort when, in addition to the two prior contacts with the plaintiff's employer, he
further brought to the bank's attention the letter to him . . . from the plaintiff's
lawyer."
"...
Wise's conduct, in cumulation with his past efforts to secure from the
bank's (sic) assistance in collecting from an employee a debt he disputed as due,
exceeded what might have been within reasonable bounds in communicating with
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only because the contacts with the employer extended over a
period of time, and continued after the creditor was notified
that the employee was in good faith asserting a legal defense
to the claim. Further, the court places great weight on the
fact that the creditor brought the letter from the debtor's attorney to the employer's attention.3 On the other hand, there is
an indication the court felt the holding should not be so nar34
rowly construed.
Save Quina v. Robert's,35 a landmark Louisiana decision
heavily relied upon in the instant case, no other case has been
found which would give a debtor-employee such protection in
the absence of a falsely imputed debt 6 or libelous statement. 7 In
Quina, the creditor sent the employer of his debtor a document
purporting to be a legal form which named the employee as
defendant in an action brought by the creditor, and on which
the amount due was overstated tenfold. Clearly the intent was
to mislead the employer and cause him to exert coercive influence on the debtor to pay the account; and, although the employer was not misled and did not attempt to coerce payment,
the creditor was held liable to the employee. It is difficult to
ascertain whether Pack constitutes an extension of liability
beyond that of Quina. One judge, dissenting from refusal to
grant a rehearing, 3 attempted to distinguish the two cases on
the grounds that in Pack no misleading documents were used,
and the defendant was claiming only the amount which he felt
in good faith was due. There is possible merit in such a distinction, since there is little social value in the course of conduct adopted by the defendant in Quina, while conduct of the
defendant in Pack probably finds sanction among businessmen.
Under such interpretation the instant case would extend protection beyond the rule of Quina. On the other hand, the employer
was not misled in Quints, and it is possible that the overstatement of debt was merely an error.8 9 In this light the protection
the employer about its employee's private affairs." (Emphasis added.) 155
at 914.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).
36. See note 6 supra.
37. Ibid.
38. The dissenting judge, differing from the majority in interpretation
facts, argued that "the evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that it was
untruthful statements to his employer, and not Wise's communications,
caused Pack to be fired." 155 So. 2d at 918.
39. Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558, 559 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).

So. 2d

of the
Pack's
which
Here
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afforded the employee in Pack seems safely within the protection afforded in Quina. In any event, Pack and Quina appear
to place Louisiana at the forefront in extending protection to
the debtor, and though the scope of protection is far from clear,
it would appear the Louisiana creditor will act at his peril in
the future in using employer contact as a collection method.
Whether such an extension of protection is sound from a
policy viewpoint is another problem. While it is true that the
creditor has legal remedies to collect just debts, in the case of
small amounts, the remedy is often illusory. In such cases it
is as much an injustice to allow the debtor to hide behind the
law as to allow the creditor extra-judicial remedies. Further, if
the employer ever has a valid interest in the financial status of
his employees, certainly such an interest should have been present in the instant case in which the employee held a trusted position in a financial institution. If the position is taken that the
employer has the right to such information, one who gives the
information could hardly violate an employee's privacy.
However, other policy considerations appear to weigh even
more heavily in favor of the decision. The motive of any creditor
who brings a debt to the employer's attention is likely to be
coercion of the employee through "trial-by-employer"a dubious proceeding in which the rights of the employee are lightly
regarded, and the swiftness of the "justice" rendered dependent
upon the consciousness of the employer of his public image and
the amount of the creditor's dealings with the employer. Further, from the employee's standpoint, any such intrusion is likely to influence the employer adversely as to promotions and salary increases.
It is submitted that the instant decision reaches a sound result under the facts of the case. Whether it would be desirable
that the holding be extended to make a creditor liable every time
he contacts an employer of a debtor is another matter. Our society is not yet so perfect that persons have the right to claim
protection from all annoyances, least of all those who have participated in activities which give rise to disputed debts. Though
the Louisiana result may well represent the wave of the future,
courts can afford from an administrative standpoint to protect
the original indebtedness was $14.95. Quina made payments of $13.50, so the true
balance was $1.45. The employer was notified that Quina had paid only $3.50.
After Quina's explanation the employer advised him to contact a lawyer.
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the more tender sensibilities only as the likelihood of these sensibilities being offended decreases.
Kenneth D. McCoy, Jr.

TORTS -

TRESPASS BY MUNICIPALITY -

PUNITIVE EFFECT OF

DAMAGES FOR MENTAL SUFFERING

Defendant municipality constructed streets on plaintiff's
property without her consent and without expropriation proceedings for which plaintiff brought an action to recover the
value of the land taken and additional compensation for mental
anguish resulting from the illegal trespass. The trial court
awarded damages for both the trespass and mental anguish. The
Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit affirmed. Held, a muncipality which takes property without expropriation proceedings
is liable to the landowner for trespass damages which include
damages for mental anguish as well as for the value of the land
taken. Belgarde v. City of Natchitoches, 156 So. 2d 132 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963).
Indemnification for mental anguish and suffering has never
presented the problem in the civil law that it has at common
law. French jurisprudence has had no difficulty in making such
awards for torts when the mental suffering has been real and
serious.1 The original position at common law was to disallow
recovery unless accompanied by some established tort,2 but there
is a growing trend toward recognition of the infliction of mental
suffering as a separate tort.3 Although Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2315 and 19344 correspond substantially to French Civil
Code articles 1382 and 1149-1151, respectively, Louisiana's original position on damages for mental suffering did not adhere to
the French interpretation; but it has since undergone a development similar to that of the common law. Mental anguish occa1. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LouISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 252 (1959).

2. PROSSER, TORTS § 2, at 40 (2d ed. 1955) ; 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 460, 470 (1960) : "The treatment of any element of damages as a
parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A
factor which is today recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely
a question of social, economic and industrial needs as those needs are reflected

in the Organic law."
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).

4. LA, CIVIL CODE arts. 2315 and 1934 (1870).

